Intolerance of Uncertainty as a Treatment Target: What the Evidence Supports
By Dr. Douglas Cowan, Psy.D., MFT. A Dive Deeper article for licensed clinicians.
Many clients with chronic worry say some version of “I just need to know.” That sentence points to a construct with two decades of research behind it. This article reviews what the literature supports about intolerance of uncertainty (IU), where the evidence is thin, and how to use it in session. The companion piece for the public is Overthinking and the Need to Know.
From a worry model to a transdiagnostic factor
IU was first developed to explain worry in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Carleton (2012) argues that it is a broad, transdiagnostic dispositional risk factor for developing and maintaining clinically significant anxiety, and that clinicians may benefit from including it in case conceptualization and as a treatment target. His later synthesis (Carleton, 2016) places fear of the unknown alongside related constructs, including neuroticism, and concludes that mounting evidence supports it as a core transdiagnostic construct.
McEvoy and Mahoney (2012) tested the idea in a treatment-seeking sample of 328 people. IU was associated with symptoms of social phobia, panic disorder and agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, GAD, and depression. It explained unique variance when neuroticism was controlled, and it partially mediated the link between neuroticism and every symptom measure. The authors distinguish prospective anxiety (anticipating future uncertainty), which mediated worry and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, from inhibitory anxiety (inaction in the face of uncertainty), which mediated social anxiety, panic, agoraphobia, and depression. The mediation was strongest for worry. Because the data were cross-sectional, the mediation analysis is a statistical model of association and does not establish causal order.
A neurobiological frame
Grupe and Nitschke (2013) view anxiety through uncertainty about possible future threat. When a threat is uncertain, the ability to avoid it or reduce its impact is disrupted, producing anxiety. They identify five processes that support adaptive anticipation and propose that changes in how the brain carries out these processes underlie maladaptive responses to uncertainty. The framework is influential, but it is a proposal that still requires direct testing in clinical samples.
Why worry persists: the contrast avoidance model
Newman and Llera (2011) offer an account of why worry resists extinction. In their contrast avoidance model, people with GAD are especially sensitive to sharp negative shifts in emotion. Worry maintains a mildly negative state, which prevents the contrast of an unexpected bad event arriving during calm. If the model holds, some clients may experience relaxation as unsafe, which would complicate relaxation training. That is a hypothesis to watch for, not a documented finding. The model remains one of several competing accounts, and I present it to clients as a possibility to test, not a fact.
Does changing IU change outcomes?
Boswell et al. (2013) gave up to 18 weeks of transdiagnostic cognitive behavioral therapy to patients with a range of anxiety and depressive disorders. IU scores were highest in GAD and panic disorder but did not differ significantly by the presence or absence of a given diagnosis. IU fell during treatment, and the size of the change was related to the reduction in anxiety and depressive symptoms across diagnostic categories. The design is correlational, so IU change may be a marker of general improvement as much as a mechanism.
The most direct test is the randomized trial by Dugas et al. (2022). Sixty adults with GAD (51 women; mean age 34.6) were assigned to 12 weekly one-hour sessions of Behavioral Experiments for Intolerance of Uncertainty or to a wait-list. Participants used behavioral experiments to test catastrophic beliefs about uncertainty. Treatment outperformed wait-list on GAD severity, worry, depression, somatic anxiety, and IU. The combined sample showed large decreases on every outcome, and gains were maintained or increased through 12-month follow-up. The authors suggest the focused treatment may be as efficacious as more comprehensive evidence-based approaches, though this trial did not compare them directly.
Limits and open questions
- The wait-list design cannot separate specific effects from the general effects of therapy.
- The sample was small and predominantly female, and replication in larger, more diverse groups is needed.
- Most supporting studies rely on self-report IU measures, which share method variance with symptom scales.
- Whether IU is a cause, a correlate, or a consequence of anxiety remains unresolved.
Clinical suggestions
Assess it. A brief self-report IU scale gives you a baseline and a shared language with the client. Pair it with a symptom measure such as the GAD-7, which is available on our anxiety check-in page.
Teach the distinction. Help clients separate problem-solving worry (there is a next step) from “what if” worry (there is none). The first is acted on. The second becomes the treatment target.
Design experiments, not exercises. The Dugas et al. protocol frames each task as a test of a prediction. Ask the client to write what they expect to happen and how badly they expect to cope. Afterward, compare the prediction with the result.
Watch for reassurance and checking. These behaviors bring brief relief and keep IU alive. Plan a graded delay rather than a ban.
Listen for the contrast problem. If a client says “when I relax, that is when something bad happens,” consider the contrast avoidance model as one explanation. Pair relaxation skills with experiments so the client can test that belief.
Add a body-based skill. Slow breathing with long exhales gives clients something to do in the moment while the experiments do the longer work. Our free guided breathing exercise is one place to practice.
Build on strengths. Clients with high IU are often conscientious and thorough. Name those traits and show how they serve the client once worry no longer drives them. A treatment plan that only lists deficits sends the wrong message about the person.
Summary
The evidence supports IU as a useful, transdiagnostic treatment target, with the strongest direct support coming from one well-designed but modest trial. It gives clients a clear, shame-free explanation and gives clinicians a concrete place to intervene. The next step for the field is larger trials with active comparison groups. In the meantime, clients can start building their tolerance for not knowing, one small experiment at a time.
Keep Reading
- Overthinking and the Need to Know: Why Your Mind Won’t Stop Asking What If (the companion article for the public)
- Coffee Conversation: Learning to Live Without All the Answers
- Try our free guided breathing exercise, about five minutes
- Breathing Strategies to Lower Anxiety
References
Boswell, J. F., Thompson-Hollands, J., Farchione, T. J., & Barlow, D. H. (2013). Intolerance of uncertainty: A common factor in the treatment of emotional disorders. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 69(6), 630–645. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.21965
Carleton, R. N. (2012). The intolerance of uncertainty construct in the context of anxiety disorders: Theoretical and practical perspectives. Expert Review of Neurotherapeutics, 12(8), 937–947. https://doi.org/10.1586/ern.12.82
Carleton, R. N. (2016). Into the unknown: A review and synthesis of contemporary models involving uncertainty. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 39, 30–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2016.02.007
Dugas, M. J., Sexton, K. A., Hebert, E. A., Bouchard, S., Gouin, J.-P., & Shafran, R. (2022). Behavioral experiments for intolerance of uncertainty: A randomized clinical trial for adults with generalized anxiety disorder. Behavior Therapy, 53(6), 1147–1160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2022.05.003
Grupe, D. W., & Nitschke, J. B. (2013). Uncertainty and anticipation in anxiety: An integrated neurobiological and psychological perspective. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14(7), 488–501. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn3524
McEvoy, P. M., & Mahoney, A. E. J. (2012). To be sure, to be sure: Intolerance of uncertainty mediates symptoms of various anxiety disorders and depression. Behavior Therapy, 43(3), 533–545. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2011.02.007
Newman, M. G., & Llera, S. J. (2011). A novel theory of experiential avoidance in generalized anxiety disorder: A review and synthesis of research supporting a contrast avoidance model of worry. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3), 371–382. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.01.008